As Trump, Putin and Xi prepare to meet at APEC, a settlement touching Europe’s security may be shaped in a room where Europe has no seat.
On Thursday, in a southern Chinese city better known for semiconductors than statecraft, three men will sit down together for the first time. The Kremlin confirmed on Saturday that Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Donald Trump will meet in Shenzhen on 19 November on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. The White House has said the same, and on Monday China’s foreign ministry confirmed that the three would discuss “safeguarding world peace and promoting strategic stability”. The leaders of the world’s three largest nuclear powers have met in pairs many times. They have never met as a three, which is what makes the Shenzhen trilateral worth watching closely.
The last time three leaders gathered to settle the shape of a continent, the venue was a palace in Crimea. At Yalta, in February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed the post-war order for Europe. The three moved Poland’s eastern frontier westward to a line Stalin had long wanted and arranged among themselves the government that would rule it. The Poles who had fought beside the Allies since 1939 were not consulted. They learned their borders from a communiqué.
The comparison has limits. It also has a point.
The Case for Calm
There is a serious argument that the Shenzhen trilateral deserves less alarm than it is receiving. The White House has framed the meeting around nuclear arms control, and the subject is overdue. New START expired in February with no successor in force, leaving the American and Russian strategic arsenals without legal limits, a gap not seen since 1972. China’s stockpile is growing, and Beijing has so far refused any negotiating format that would cap it. A conversation among the three powers that hold most of the world’s warheads is, on its own terms, better than silence.
The other signals point the same way. Even the Kremlin’s foreign policy aide, Yuri Ushakov, has described the session as exploratory, a chance to test positions rather than conclude agreements. Sources cited by the South China Morning Post say the three sides have kept Ukraine off the shared agenda and are searching instead for a commitment to limit the role of artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control. Most telling of all, the German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has said that during their talks in Beijing on 30 October Xi called the war in Ukraine a European conflict in which Europeans must sit at the negotiating table. If the host does not want to broker Europe’s peace, and the agreed agenda leaves the war aside, the room may hold less than its symbolism suggests.
That reading is reasonable. It is also incomplete.
What Moscow Brings to the Shenzhen Trilateral
Agendas set in Washington and Beijing do not bind the third participant at the Shenzhen trilateral. Putin has sought this format to discuss Ukraine without Kyiv present, and he has made little secret of it. The proposal for the meeting came from Putin in an October call with the White House, a call to which Volodymyr Zelensky was not party. A Russian lawmaker has reportedly described the prospect as a “new Yalta”. Moscow does not choose its historical references by accident.
Nor is arms control a subject that stops at the Atlantic. For years Russia has insisted that any limits on its forces must account for the British and French deterrents. Reports citing diplomatic sources, unconfirmed by Moscow, suggest it may also seek to have allied deployments on NATO’s eastern flank revert to their 1997 posture. The idea has a documented history: the draft treaties Russia put to Washington and NATO in December 2021 sought to limit military activity in states that joined the alliance after May 1997. Either idea could surface at the Shenzhen trilateral under the very heading Beijing has chosen for it. Both concern the defence of European states that will have no voice when they are raised. Moscow no longer hides its interest in that wider order. The Kremlin now says it must first talk with European representatives to judge what they can contribute to a settlement.
This is where the Yalta parallel earns its place. Nobody in February 1945 announced a partition. The agreements spoke of free elections, democratic institutions and the rights of liberated peoples. The language held up well. The arrangements made in the room proved far more durable than the language. A Shenzhen trilateral that produces only a statement on nuclear restraint could still, in the margins, establish which questions belong to the great powers and which are left to everyone else.
The Question Nobody in Europe Has Answered
The Union cannot demand a chair at a Shenzhen trilateral to which it was never invited. It can, however, decide in advance what it would not accept from one, and say so before Thursday rather than after. On that measure the record of the past week is thin.
European leaders did settle one question in Dublin last week. Rather than appoint a single envoy, they named a European team for the Ukraine peace talks. It joins the EU institutions to five governments: France, Germany, Italy and Poland from inside the Union, and Britain from outside it. Security guarantees are left to the coalition of the willing, in close coordination with NATO. Whether the High Representative, Kaja Kallas, will hold a seat remains unclear. Europe has now decided who carries its pen. What that pen would write has barely been considered. The Union has called at the United Nations for a new binding framework to replace New START, but its leaders have said nothing about what a three-power arrangement would mean for Europe’s own security. No joint declaration from Paris and London has said that their deterrents are not a bargaining chip available to others.
Drawing such lines would require no new institutions and no new money. It requires three sentences, agreed among the capitals that matter and delivered publicly before the leaders arrive in Shenzhen.
Three Lines Worth Drawing
The first concerns the nuclear question. Any framework that counts British or French forces must be negotiated with Britain and France, at a table where they sit. France, the only nuclear power inside the Union, and Britain, which holds its deterrent outside it, should remind Washington of that before it meets Moscow, not after.
The second concerns force posture. Decisions about allied deployments on the eastern flank belong to NATO collectively. No bilateral understanding between Washington and Moscow can trade them away, still less a three-way one hosted by Beijing. Warsaw, Vilnius, Tallinn and Riga need to hear that from Brussels and Berlin this week.
The third concerns Ukraine. Kyiv has already warned that a meeting of the three powers would encourage Moscow to prolong the war. Europe should state plainly that it will recognise no terms for Ukraine agreed without Ukraine, and that its sanctions, its reconstruction finance and its accession process will not be adjusted to fit an understanding reached elsewhere.
Not one of these positions is radical. Each restates commitments the Union and its members have made repeatedly. The point is timing. A position published on Wednesday shapes the Shenzhen trilateral before it begins. A statement issued on Friday merely comments on it.
The Room and the Record
There is a final irony in the comparison. The palace at Livadia where the 1945 conference sat stands on land that Russia annexed in 2014 and still holds. The geography of Yalta has itself become one of the unresolved questions that any settlement of the current war would have to address. History has not simply rhymed. It has circled back to the same coastline.
Europe does not need to fear that Thursday will produce a new partition. The more plausible danger is quieter. A meeting framed around warheads could set a precedent that matters of European security can be raised, explored and provisionally agreed among powers outside the continent, with Europeans briefed afterwards. Precedents of that kind are rarely announced. They accumulate.
At Yalta, the absent parties had little power to object. Europe in 2026 has a great deal: a single market of some 450 million people, most of the immobilised Russian central bank assets, two nuclear arsenals, and the armies that would guard any ceasefire line. What it has lacked is the habit of stating its terms before others meet. The Shenzhen trilateral offers a test of whether the Union can learn that habit in time.
There are three chairs on Thursday. The task for Europe is to make sure that what it will and will not accept is already on the table when the leaders take their seats.
The Weekly Editorial
This is the editorial position of The European Post, published weekly on matters of European and international strategic significance. It represents the view of the Editorial Board.


