Hanoi: The Vietnam investment protection agreement is still unfinished business, even as Brussels and Hanoi celebrate a rapidly deepening partnership. On 22 October 2026, Vietnamese President To Lam met Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Antonio Costa in Brussels, and the leaders called for swift ratification of a treaty signed in 2019. Fewer than twenty EU member states have ratified it so far.
The meeting took place against a stronger political backdrop than any in recent years. In January the two sides raised their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership, and the leaders welcomed the momentum that followed. They also called for full implementation of the EU-Vietnam free trade agreement, which has cut tariffs on a large share of bilateral trade since it entered into force. Investment protection was meant to be the second pillar, giving European investors in Vietnam, and Vietnamese investors in Europe, legal certainty that trade rules alone cannot provide.
The delay in ratifying the Vietnam investment protection agreement has a clear cause. After the Court of Justice ruled in 2017 that agreements containing investor dispute settlement need approval from national parliaments, the EU split its trade deals into two tracks. The trade part can enter into force with EU approval, while the investment part must pass through every national ratification procedure. The Vietnam investment protection agreement now shows the cost of that choice, because a handful of slow capitals can hold up a treaty that most governments have already accepted.
For Hanoi, the Vietnam investment protection agreement carries practical stakes. The country wants European capital for manufacturing, renewable energy and infrastructure, and it competes with neighbours for every project. Investors weigh legal predictability heavily, and a pending treaty leaves a gap that rivals can exploit. For Europe, a ratified treaty would support firms entering a market that has become central to electronics, textiles and supply chain diversification.
The leaders also sketched a broader agenda. They pointed to cooperation on critical raw materials, technology, the green transition, strategic infrastructure and the blue economy, using the Global Gateway strategy and the Just Energy Transition Partnership as vehicles. They recognised potential cooperation on maritime security, cybersecurity and crisis management, each in line with their laws and priorities. That language is cautious, yet it shows that the relationship now extends beyond trade into security, a shift driven by tension in the South China Sea and by European efforts to find reliable partners in Asia.
The political message on the Vietnam investment protection agreement is therefore simple. Brussels cannot ask Hanoi for deeper strategic ties while parts of the existing framework remain stuck in national parliaments. Closing that gap would cost little and would signal reliability to partners across Southeast Asia, where Europe is competing for attention with other powers.
The responsibility lies with the remaining capitals. If they finish ratification, the Vietnam investment protection agreement can give the new strategic partnership the legal backbone it needs. If they do not, the partnership will keep running ahead of its own paperwork.
