Tokyo: The EU Japan partnership entered the autumn with a long agenda and one stubborn irritant, and the irritant is steel. When Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 17 June 2026, she raised Tokyo’s objections to the tariff measures the EU intends to impose on Japanese steel products, along with concerns about the Industrial Accelerator Act. The talk lasted about twenty minutes, yet it showed how a relationship built on shared values now has to absorb real trade friction.
Both sides still have strong reasons to keep the EU Japan partnership moving. Von der Leyen described Japan as a reliable partner, and the two leaders agreed in principle on a Horizon Europe framework that would let Japanese researchers take part in the programme. They said they wanted to sign it as soon as possible and to expand researcher exchanges. For a Commission that wants Horizon Europe to look like a global platform, a Japanese association would be a useful prize.
The security agenda gives the relationship its weight. The leaders discussed Russia’s war against Ukraine, China’s activities in the Indo-Pacific and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes, including the abductions issue that matters so much in Japanese politics. Japan also proposed cooperation in advanced technology and in the defence industry. The EU and Japan already have a security and defence partnership on paper, and the question for 2026 is whether paper commitments become joint projects, from shared procurement to cooperation on drones and space.
Economic security is the thread that ties these topics together in the EU Japan partnership. Both economies depend on imported critical minerals and on supply chains that run through China, and both have learned how quickly export controls can bite. Tokyo and Brussels agreed to work on supply chain resilience for critical minerals and essential goods. That is sensible, but it sits awkwardly beside a steel regime that Japan sees as protectionist. A partner cannot easily be asked to share the burden of de-risking while its exporters face new barriers.
The digital track shows what works when both sides stay practical. At the Digital Partnership Council in Tokyo in May 2025, Executive Vice-President Henna Virkkunen and her Japanese counterparts listed cooperation on artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technology, submarine cables and cybersecurity. Those are areas where regulators trust one another and where the commercial gains are mutual. The EU Japan partnership works best when it treats trade defence as a technical question and keeps the strategic questions at the top of the agenda.
Brussels therefore faces a choice about sequencing. It can treat the steel dispute as a bilateral nuisance and hope the research deal and the security dialogue carry the relationship through. Or it can use the steel measures as a chance to show that its trade defence tools have room for friends, through quota allocations, consultation and a clear review clause. Japan has made clear that it will keep asking for information on the new measures, and the Commission has committed to share it.
The coming months will show which approach the EU Japan partnership will follow. A signed Horizon Europe framework, a first concrete defence-industrial project and a workable steel arrangement would together make the EU Japan partnership look like the Indo-Pacific anchor that both governments describe in their speeches. Without progress on steel, the speeches will sound more ambitious than the results, and Tokyo will notice the gap before anyone else does.
