Brussels: The Syria Cooperation Agreement of 1977 is back in full effect after the Council of the EU ended its partial suspension, a step that closes a legal chapter opened by the repression of 2011. The Council repealed Decision 2011/523/EU, which had restricted trade with Syria since September 2011. The decision entered into force on the day of adoption, according to a Council source dated 11 May 2026.
The suspension had two layers. Introduced in September 2011 and extended in February 2012, it removed quantitative restrictions on imports of certain Syrian products, including oil, petroleum products, gold, precious metals and diamonds. Lifting it restores the trade framework that governed relations before the war, which makes the Syria Cooperation Agreement a practical tool again and not only a symbol.
The Council’s reasoning on the Syria Cooperation Agreement is political and legal. After the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and after the May 2025 decision lifting economic sanctions, the conditions that justified the suspension no longer applied. The Council kept sanctions imposed on security grounds, so the move does not amount to a blanket normalisation.
The timetable has one more step. The European Commission must notify the Syrian authorities, and the reinstated provisions then apply from the first day of the first month after that notification. Until the notice lands, exporters and importers cannot rely on the restored Syria Cooperation Agreement, a gap that officials in Brussels and Damascus should keep short.
Migration lies in the background. Press coverage of the EU’s outreach to Damascus links the renewed ties to hopes of returns of Syrian refugees, though the Council text itself says nothing about migration. Readers should keep that distinction in mind, since the legal basis of the decision is trade and the end of conditions set in 2011.
The wider test is governance. A restored Syria Cooperation Agreement gives the EU a framework for dialogue, yet the 1977 text says little about human rights compared with newer association agreements. Brussels could pair it with reporting benchmarks and with support for transitional justice, so that trade benefits follow reform and not only the passage of time.
Two signals deserve attention. One is the date of the Commission’s notification, and the other is whether Damascus responds with concrete steps on customs and public finance. If both move quickly, the Syria Cooperation Agreement could become the backbone of a slow but real reconnection; if they stall, it will remain a legal document without much economic effect.





