Brussels: The European Union’s defence policy has undergone its most significant transformation since the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999. The ReArm Europe Plan, presented in March 2025 and now branded Readiness 2030, aims to mobilise up to 800 billion euros in additional defence expenditure across the bloc by the end of the decade. As of early 2026, the architecture is largely in place, but the harder questions of industrial capacity, joint procurement and strategic prioritisation remain unresolved.
The instrument’s centrepiece is the activation of the national escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact. Member states that request it are permitted to exceed deficit targets by up to 1.5 percent of GDP for defence expenditure over a four-year window starting in 2025. As of February 2026, seventeen member states had activated the clause. Commission estimates suggest that, if fully utilised across the bloc, this flexibility alone could open fiscal space approaching 650 billion euros.
A second component is the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, which provides loans for joint procurement of defined capability categories. Negotiations with non-EU partners, including the United Kingdom, Canada and Norway, have opened access to SAFE-funded contracts under security and defence partnerships. This represents a significant evolution in how Brussels approaches industrial cooperation with close allies who fall outside the single market.
National choices reflect the variety of starting points across the Union. Germany’s 2026 budget allocates a record sum to military procurement, part of Berlin’s pledge to build the strongest conventional army on the continent. France has set its 2026 defence allocation at 68.5 billion euros, or 2.25 percent of GDP. The Netherlands has more than doubled its defence budget since 2021, reaching around 2.2 percent of GDP. The eastern flank carries the highest relative weight: Poland’s allocation now exceeds 4.4 percent of GDP, Lithuania approaches 4 percent, with Latvia and Estonia close behind. By NATO’s count, every EU NATO member reached at least 2 percent of GDP on defence in 2025.
These figures, while striking, conceal structural weaknesses. European defence remains fragmented across roughly 170 distinct major weapons systems, compared with around 30 in the United States. Joint procurement, which the European Defence Industry Programme and the Defence Industrial Strategy were designed to incentivise, has progressed but remains the exception rather than the rule. Without consolidation, additional spending risks reproducing duplication rather than building genuine collective capability.
A separate concern is the absorptive capacity of the European defence industrial base. Production lines for ammunition, air defence systems, armoured vehicles and unmanned systems have expanded, but lead times for major platforms remain long, supply chains depend on critical inputs sourced from third countries, and the workforce pipeline is constrained. The European Drone Defence Initiative, announced in October 2025, illustrates the new operational priorities: a continent-wide network of sensors, jamming systems and counter-drone weapons designed in response to lessons drawn from the war in Ukraine and the airspace incidents along the eastern border.
The institutional architecture has also evolved. The second von der Leyen Commission created a dedicated Commissioner for Defence and Space, and the European Parliament elevated its Subcommittee on Security and Defence to full committee status. These structural choices signal that defence is no longer treated as an annex to foreign policy but as a core competence with its own political weight.
Critics argue that the ReArm Europe framework, while financially ambitious, leaves untouched the deeper question of strategic prioritisation. Independent analysts have noted that the projected 800 billion euros may not fully materialise, that fragmentation persists, and that more transformative instruments, such as Next Generation EU-style joint borrowing for defence, were considered and set aside. If a peace settlement in Ukraine proves elusive in 2026, these tools may yet return to the table.




