Washington and Tehran are trading terms through Qatari mediators, and Israel and the Gulf states are arranging their own defences. By the Commission President’s count, the Union has absorbed an extra €90 billion in import costs, yet its own published texts set no conditions for easing its Iran sanctions.

The Iran settlement is being written in rooms that Europe does not sit in. On Tuesday, President Trump said the war would be over “very soon” and offered no details. Three days earlier he had rejected Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, calling its conditions unacceptable. On Wednesday, Iranian officials said Tehran had received Washington’s formal reply, whose contents were not disclosed.

The channel runs through mediators. Axios reported that they were meeting Iran’s foreign minister in New York to discuss a Qatari proposal, and that a US official called the indirect talks positive while the sides remained divided over who moves first. The same reporting said Washington would ease sanctions and release frozen funds in return for concrete nuclear steps. Trump then denied it in a social media post, writing that he had offered nothing.

This has happened before. The European Council commended Pakistan, Qatar, and other mediators of the June memorandum and said the Union stood ready to support its implementation. By early July the strait was effectively closed again, as the IEA recorded.

The Case for Distance, and Why It Fails

There is a fair case for Europe’s distance. Europe is not a party to the war, and the Union’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, said in March that it is not Europe’s war. Qatar, which carries the current proposal, holds a channel to Tehran that Brussels does not. Kallas has also met Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, in New York in a week when he saw counterparts from more than ten European countries. A bloc that neither started the conflict nor can end it may reasonably stay out of the bargaining.

The case for staying out of the Iran settlement fails on the bill.

What the Iran War Has Already Cost the Union

In her State of the Union address on 16 September, Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament that imported fossil fuels have cost the Union an additional €90 billion since the conflict began, with no extra energy delivered.

The strait is a large part of that cost, though not all of it. The International Energy Agency put Gulf net exports of diesel and gasoil in August at 390,000 barrels a day, just over a quarter of the pre-war level, and noted that Ukrainian strikes on Russian refining have compounded the loss. Transport & Environment estimates that record diesel prices are costing Europe an extra €203 million a day.

A stake is not a claim. Paying for a war does not entitle a bloc to a place at its settlement, and a statement of readiness is not an offer with a price. What earns a place at a negotiating table is something the parties need that only the newcomer can supply. Europe holds one such thing, and it is its own Iran sanctions, which only the Council can lift. The claim is real but modest. The measures the Council reintroduced in September 2025 cover imports of Iranian crude oil, natural gas, and petrochemicals, and sales of energy-sector equipment and gold, and Washington cannot waive them. Europe does not hold the decisive instrument, but a deal that promises Iran a return to oil and gold trade would be incomplete without it.

Israel and the Gulf States Are Arranging Their Own Security

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spent about six hours in the United Arab Emirates on Sunday and met President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed. His office said the trip focused on relations and regional challenges, and it named the head of the Mossad and the head of the National Security Council among those travelling with him. CNN reported that it was his first publicly acknowledged visit to the country, and that an Israeli source said Iran dominated the talks.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry condemned the visit and warned regional governments of “very dangerous consequences.” The military side of the relationship is already visible. In May, US Ambassador Mike Huckabee confirmed that Israel had sent Iron Dome batteries, and personnel to operate them, to the UAE.

Two days after the Netanyahu visit, UAE Vice President Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh. It was the first high-level bilateral meeting since last year’s rupture over Yemen, and it came while Riyadh faces mounting Houthi attacks.

Air defence, intelligence sharing, and the relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are being settled among the states that live with the consequences. The published accounts of both meetings describe bilateral talks and name no European participant. Whoever underwrites the strait’s security will also shape its transit terms, and Europe’s ships and fuel bills will live with those terms.

The Sanctions the Union Controls and the Terms It Has Not Stated

Europe does hold instruments. On 22 May the Council widened its Iran sanctions framework to cover those who threaten freedom of navigation in the Middle East, and on 8 June it listed two individuals and one entity, among them the Guard Navy command that runs a toll system in the strait. In February the Council also added the Revolutionary Guard to the EU terrorist list, after political agreement in January, and it had already reimposed its wider Iran sanctions after the UN snapback in September 2025.

An American offer of relief changes none of that. The Union has stated aims: in Islamabad on 1 June, Kallas said any temporary understanding must be followed by deeper talks on Tehran’s nuclear stockpile. Aims are not terms. In the same remarks she listed what the Union could offer, from maritime operations to economic incentives, and named no price. Her remarks that day set out no conditions for easing any European measure.

On 31 August, in a statement tied to the G20 finance ministers’ meeting, the Union went further. It said it welcomes additional economic pressure on Iran, including through the US-led Operation Economic Outcast, and will keep working with Washington and the G7 to maintain it. Europe has endorsed the American stick without saying what the carrot should be, or whether its own sanctions belong in the Iran settlement at all.

European statements so far say what the Union opposes. Kallas said on 22 September that there were no tolls or fees before the war and should be none after it. In Tehran, meanwhile, Iran’s parliamentary security commission has approved penalties for ships that break its transit rules, including confiscation of a fifth of the cargo, according to IRNA, as relayed by ANI. The bill still needs a floor vote and Constitutional Council approval.

The naval option has stalled. On Monday, Kallas said requests for escorts are greater than ever and that the Union lacks the ships, and she urged governments to send vessels pledged for the Hormuz mission to the Red Sea instead.

A principle with no instrument behind it is a preference. Tehran’s own proposal asks Washington to lift the blockade, waive oil sanctions, and release frozen assets. Brussels runs a sanctions regime of its own, and its price for easing that regime is still unwritten.

Three Terms the Union Should State Before the Iran Settlement Is Signed

Three steps would turn a bystander into a counterparty in the Iran settlement.

First, the Council should publish the conditions under which it would ease any Iran measure, beginning with transit that is free of tolls and permits and checked by an independent monitor. That would also separate European sanctions from the American campaign Brussels has endorsed, so that European relief cannot be assumed to follow American relief. This is the step that turns a stake into a claim. The parties need to know what Europe will do with its sanctions, and that need is the reason to consult it.

Second, the Union should ask Qatar and the other mediators for a formal European channel into the Iran settlement talks, and give its sanctions as the reason. The natural venue is the EU-GCC summit in Saudi Arabia on 24 October, where European leaders will meet the leaders of the six Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The mediators need to know what Europe will accept, and Europe needs to hear what is on offer before it is asked to endorse the Iran settlement.

Third, the Council should settle the naval question. Either the ships pledged for Hormuz go there under a written mandate, or the mission is closed and the pledge withdrawn. A stalled mission tells Tehran and Washington that European words come without hulls.

The obvious objection is unanimity. Twenty-seven governments will struggle to agree on a war aim. But a list of conditions is easier to agree than a war aim, because it names what Europe would accept and commits no ship or soldier.

An Iran settlement priced without Europe will be priced against it. The €90 billion in extra import costs is what the war has added to Europe’s fuel bill so far. The next invoice arrives with the terms of the peace: transit rules, permits, and sanctions decisions that Europe will be asked to accept rather than help write. That is the moment when a published set of conditions would matter, and it comes before the deal, not after.