Brussels: Operation Aspides, the EU naval mission launched in February 2024 to protect shipping in the Red Sea, now faces a capacity test that political statements cannot solve. High Representative Kaja Kallas told capitals bluntly that the mission needs at least ten ships and that it is not there. Her letter of 19 September asked member states for more naval and air assets for the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The current force is thin. Italy and Greece supply the three core ships, while Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Belgium contribute vessels on a rotating basis. Rotation keeps the mission alive, but it does not build the continuous presence that escort work requires when Houthi strikes escalate.
Responses to Kallas so far amount to two additional warships. The Netherlands offers a frigate in an associate role focused on situational awareness and information gathering, which helps with intelligence but not with escort. Belgium offers the frigate Leopold I, which has technical problems and is not expected before next year. Neither pledge changes the balance of forces in the strait this autumn.
The shortfall matters because the threat has widened. Houthi attacks in September hit Saudi energy and maritime infrastructure, and the mission’s remit now sits in a debate about whether Operation Aspides should cover more than the Red Sea. Its mandate also refers to Hormuz, although the ships operate in the Red Sea. Italy has complained that other states are not supportive enough and has floated financial contributions as an alternative to hulls.
Money is a weak substitute for ships. Warships need crews, air defence and logistics that months of notice cannot always supply, and common funding would not conjure frigates from navies already stretched by Baltic and Mediterranean commitments. A fairer burden-sharing formula could, however, reward states that cannot deploy with payment for those that can, which would turn the Italian suggestion into a workable rule.
The political context sharpens the problem. Europe can hardly claim a role in Gulf and Red Sea security while its own mission stays underequipped, and Kallas made her September appeal as Houthi escalation disrupted flights and energy facilities across Saudi Arabia. Shipping companies watch these signals closely, because insurers and charterers judge a naval mission by the ships on station, not by the communiques that describe it.
A second constraint is command and control. Rotating contributions mean that crews, rules of engagement and maintenance cycles change every few months, which burdens the operational headquarters and limits what commanders can plan. A smaller but permanent core would give Operation Aspides steadier output than a larger pool of ships that appear for a single deployment and leave before the next escalation.
The next signals will come from the Foreign Affairs Council and from national defence ministries. If more states commit vessels with firm dates, Operation Aspides can move toward the ten-ship target Kallas set. If pledges stay at two, the Red Sea will remain a test of Europe’s gap between strategic ambition and naval capacity, and Operation Aspides will keep operating below the level its own architects say it needs.
