Berlin: The German finance ministry has begun the spring round of capital-to-capital consultations on the next multiannual financial framework with a position paper that is unusually candid about what Berlin considers acceptable and what it does not. The trigger is a European Parliament resolution adopted on 28 April by 370 votes to 201 that calls for the 2028-2034 framework to be set at 1.27 percent of EU gross national income, corresponding to €1.789 trillion in constant 2025 prices, with an additional 0.11 percent of GNI, or €149.3 billion, dedicated to repaying the debt created by NextGenerationEU above the framework ceilings.
The Commission’s proposal, tabled earlier this year, comes in at €1.76 trillion over the seven-year period, equivalent to 1.26 percent of GNI. The gap between Commission and Parliament is therefore narrower in headline terms than in political substance: roughly €200 billion separates the two positions once the NGEU repayment line is taken into account. For net contributor states such as Germany and the Netherlands, even the Commission’s figure is read as the upper limit of what national parliaments will ratify. The Parliament’s demand for an explicit 10 percent uplift is, in the language of the Berlin paper, “not financeable” under current fiscal trajectories.
The substantive disagreement is sharper than the arithmetic suggests. The Commission has signalled that it intends to fund new defence and artificial intelligence priorities by streamlining and consolidating existing programmes, an approach that the Parliament’s interim report adopted on 6 May explicitly rejects. Members of the budget committee argue that the cohesion envelope and the second pillar of the Common Agricultural Policy cannot serve as a balance sheet from which new priorities are silently funded. The political optics, with farmers and regional authorities already mobilised, are unforgiving for any institution that appears to favour Brussels-defined priorities over locally salient transfers.
Germany’s position, set out in the spring paper, is to support a moderate uplift only where it is matched by genuine reform of own resources, including a more robust carbon-related contribution and a redesigned single market levy. The Dutch and Austrian finance ministries are aligned in broad terms. Several southern member states, by contrast, see the Parliament’s resolution as a useful negotiating anchor and have indicated that they would accept the Commission’s figure as a floor rather than as a ceiling.
The timeline is unforgiving. Parliament has urged a political agreement by the end of 2026 to allow for orderly adoption and implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028. That target presupposes that the European Council can produce a unanimous orientation by the autumn, that the Parliament can complete its consent procedure by the spring of 2027, and that national parliaments can ratify own-resources decisions across the following year. Each step is contested. Each step has, in previous frameworks, slipped.
For the Commission, the political challenge is to keep the headline figure within a range that net contributors can defend at home while delivering enough new envelope to absorb the priorities that the von der Leyen agenda has placed at the centre of the second mandate. The Berlin paper concludes that a successful negotiation will require the Parliament to scale back its demand. The Parliament’s interim report concludes that a successful negotiation will require the Commission and Council to abandon what it describes as artificial spending caps. Both cannot be right. The autumn will tell which side is prepared to move first.




