Brussels: The European Union’s enlargement file is moving on two speeds in 2026, and the gap between them has grown into the defining political tension of the bloc’s eastward agenda. While Montenegro is on track to close all remaining negotiation chapters this year and Albania is expected to follow in 2027, Ukraine and Moldova remain blocked at the political starting line, held back by Hungary’s continued refusal to lift its veto on the opening of negotiation clusters.
The Commission’s 2025 enlargement package, presented in November, formally endorsed the target of wrapping up accession talks with Ukraine and Moldova by 2028. That timeline depends on the formal opening of all six negotiating clusters, which requires unanimity in the Council. Budapest has tied its objection to the status of the Hungarian-speaking minority in Transcarpathia, although diplomats in Brussels have long treated the argument as a leverage point rather than a substantive obstacle.
To bypass the stalemate, the Commission and the Danish presidency adopted a strategy of frontloading. Technical-level reforms are being assessed as if the negotiations were formally underway, with the European Commission providing structured guidance to Kyiv and Chisinau across all six clusters. On 17 March 2026, Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos met deputy ministers from both candidate countries in Brussels to take stock of progress on Cluster 1, the so-called fundamentals chapter that covers judiciary, anti-corruption, public administration and fundamental rights. Both governments have produced detailed reform roadmaps, and Ukraine’s screening process was successfully concluded in September 2025.
The political calculus may now be shifting. The change of power in Budapest, with Peter Magyar stepping into the role of prime minister in early May 2026, has revived hope in Brussels that Hungary’s blockade could be lifted in time for the European Council’s pre-summer summit on 18-19 June. Diplomats remain cautious, however, noting that even an informal decision to open chapters would not guarantee a smooth path through the 35 negotiating sections that lie ahead.
In the Western Balkans, momentum is more visible. Montenegro began accession talks back in 2012 and saw them effectively frozen in 2018 over rule-of-law concerns. The strategic shock of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine revived political support for the country’s European path, and Podgorica is now expected to prepare for membership by 2028. Albania, which opened negotiations more recently, is being credited with rapid reform delivery, particularly in the judicial sector.
Beyond the frontrunners, the picture is more mixed. Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo each face distinct combinations of internal political dysfunction and external vetoes from member states pursuing bilateral grievances. The experience of North Macedonia, whose accession was held up successively by Greece, Bulgaria and others, looms over the entire enlargement debate as a cautionary tale.
The structural question is whether the EU can absorb new members without first reforming its own decision-making. The Commission has hinted at staged integration, allowing candidate countries to participate in selected single-market sectors before full accession. Hungary’s veto on Ukraine has also amplified calls to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting on enlargement decisions, a reform that would itself require unanimity.
For 2026, the most consequential test will be whether political momentum can survive contact with the bloc’s institutional inertia. Montenegro’s example shows the process can deliver when conditions align. Ukraine’s case shows how easily one capital can hold the whole architecture hostage. The next twelve months will determine which precedent comes to define the decade.
