Rome: The recast of the FDI Screening Regulation, the file the Commission tabled in January 2024 and which now sits in second-reading territory after Parliament’s ECON-INTA joint report adopted in March, is reopening one of the quieter fights in the bloc’s economic security toolkit. The text under discussion narrows what member states can wave through under the minimum harmonisation floor, and the contested article is the one that finally pulls greenfield investments inside the mandatory notification net.
The political argument has not changed much since 2024. Member states with established screening regimes, led by France, Germany, Italy and Denmark, want the mandatory list to include any greenfield project above a financial threshold in sensitive sectors. Capitals that have only recently stood up screening bodies, including Ireland, Sweden and the Czech Republic, are pushing back on the workload implications, arguing that the brownfield acquisition notifications already overwhelm understaffed inter-ministerial committees. The Commission’s compromise, floated in a non-paper circulated to the working party in early May, proposes a phased trigger linked to capital intensity rather than to a flat financial threshold.
What is new is the way the file is interacting with the broader economic security package. The Outbound Investment Regulation has just begun its first reporting cycle, with national submissions due on 30 June, and the Export Control Regulation update is in the queue for the second half of 2026. Officials in DG Trade are now openly arguing that the three files need to read together at the operational level, which means common definitions of dual-use technologies, common timing for inter-agency review, and a common interface with the export control regimes already in force.
The sectoral lobby read is sharp. The semiconductor industry, which has been at the centre of every recent screening case, has been the loudest in calling for the greenfield trigger, on the basis that fabs in Europe are increasingly the vehicle for technology transfer rather than the older pattern of acquisition. The renewable energy industry, particularly wind manufacturing and the embedded electronics that go into turbine nacelles, has been arguing for the opposite, that mandatory greenfield notification would slow build-out at exactly the moment the Net-Zero Industry Act calendar bites.
For the screening authorities themselves, the operational change is significant. Italy’s Presidenza del Consiglio screening secretariat closed 285 cases in 2025, the highest annual count since the Golden Power regime was extended in 2022, and the Italian read on the recast text is that mandatory greenfield notification would push the annual workload toward 400 cases without an obvious staffing answer. The German BMWK has been more relaxed about absolute volumes but more cautious about the timeline triggers, particularly the proposed 30-day call-in window after public announcement of a greenfield project.
The political read is that the recast is unlikely to land before the Polish presidency ends in June, with the Cypriot presidency now expected to inherit the file. The compromise text being drafted at COREPER carries a transitional period of 24 months from entry into force, during which member states without existing greenfield trigger language in national law can phase in the mandatory notification regime. That window is enough to satisfy the lighter-touch capitals without giving the larger screening regimes a reason to walk away.
Where the fight ends matters for two ongoing case clusters. The first is the wave of Chinese-financed battery plant projects across central Europe, which under the recast text would clearly fall inside the greenfield trigger. The second is the smaller but politically louder set of US technology investments in pre-revenue stage life sciences clusters, which the brownfield framework has been waving through and which screening authorities are increasingly uncomfortable about.
Whether FDI Screening 2.0 ends up being the file that finally pulls the bloc’s screening regimes into convergence, or simply the one that fixes the boundary line for another five years, will be settled at the next two trilogue sessions.




