Astana: Kazakh and European officials are quietly recalibrating the 2025-2026 roadmap that anchors their critical raw materials partnership, with the most concrete deliverables now due ahead of the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress on 11-12 June. The roadmap, derived from the November 2022 memorandum on raw materials, batteries and renewable hydrogen, was meant to give European industry a workable hedge against Chinese dominance in lithium, manganese, graphite and rare earths.
A year into implementation the architecture is showing its limits. The political envelope is no longer the binding constraint. The April 2025 EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand established a 12 billion euro investment package, of which 2.5 billion was directed at critical raw materials, alongside a five-country declaration of intent. What is binding now is execution speed in three areas – financing instruments, downstream processing rules, and offtake contracts with European refiners and battery producers.
Astana’s calculation is straightforward. Kazakhstan announced last year a rare earth deposit estimated at more than 20 million tonnes of contained metal, which on paper places the country third globally behind China and Brazil. Raw geology is not extraction, and extraction is not processing. Kazakh authorities have spent the past twelve months pushing for higher domestic value retention before exports leave the country, a stance the new mining code is meant to formalise. European officials privately concede that the earlier expectation, that the bulk of Kazakh material would simply move via the Middle Corridor toward European refineries, was naive.
The June congress will be the first real test of whether the policy push has translated into financing decisions. Three signals are worth watching. The first is whether the European Investment Bank confirms specific lines for processing infrastructure rather than only upstream exploration. The second is the share of European offtake contracts that survive into binding form, particularly for tungsten and graphite where Chinese discounting has already tested earlier letters of intent. The third is how the roadmap accommodates Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik projects, which were quietly added to the pipeline after Samarkand but lack the financial substructure that Kazakhstan enjoys.
Brussels also has a strategic complication. The 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act benchmarks, requiring ten percent of EU annual consumption from domestic extraction by 2030, will not be hit without a Central Asian contribution that holds together. The Commission has begun to treat the roadmap less as a pure trade instrument and more as an industrial policy bridge between the Act’s domestic targets and the realities of a global supply map still dominated by Chinese vertical integration.
The deeper risk is not Chinese counter-pressure, which is already factored in, but European inconsistency. Member states with strong battery ambitions, particularly Germany and France, have begun negotiating bilateral side agreements that risk fragmenting the very coordinated demand signal the roadmap was designed to deliver. If those bilateral lines harden, the congress could mark less a celebration of the partnership than the moment its financial coherence began to erode.
For now the political mood remains constructive. Kazakh officials continue to frame the EU as the partner most likely to accept higher local-content requirements without retaliating. European negotiators continue to frame the country as the indispensable anchor of a wider Central Asian raw materials strategy. Whether that framing survives June will depend less on declarations than on the size and specificity of the financing announcements that follow them.




