Manila: The Philippine government has placed maritime security at the centre of its 2026 ASEAN chairmanship, and Brussels is moving quickly to convert that opening into a durable institutional foothold in Southeast Asia’s most contested waters. The chairmanship theme, “Navigating Our Future, Together,” is more than a slogan. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s three-pillar agenda, peace and security has been elevated above the trade and connectivity work that typified previous ASEAN cycles, with maritime domain awareness, freedom of navigation and rules-based dispute resolution all flagged as priority deliverables. For the European External Action Service, which signed off on a Security and Defence Dialogue with Manila in late 2025, the next nine months represent the best chance since 2016 to embed a European hand in the South China Sea conversation without depending on Washington.
The vehicles for that engagement are already in motion. The third Subcommittee on Maritime Cooperation between the EU and the Philippines, hosted in Brussels earlier this year, locked in joint working tracks on situational awareness, search-and-rescue interoperability and exchange of officers, building on the second Subcommittee held in Manila during the previous chairmanship cycle. The EU’s CRIMARIO programme and the ESIWA+ facility have already convened thirty-one Philippine ministries and agencies, from the Coast Guard to MARINA and the National Coast Watch Council Centre, around the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing platform. That architecture is explicitly designed to bind partners together without requiring the kind of treaty commitments Brussels has consistently refused to make in Asia.
The structural caution is now being tested. Manila wants tangible deliverables before the East Asia Summit window in November, including an EU observer presence in the multilateral maritime cooperative activities the Philippines has been running with Australia, Japan and the United States, and a financing channel for joint exercises such as Alalayan 2026. European member states are signalling willingness in different registers. France, which conducted the inaugural aircraft carrier visit to the Philippines in 2025, is moving toward a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement that would be Manila’s first such instrument with any European capital. Germany has tabled a defence cooperation arrangement covering cyber, armaments and logistics. Italy and the Netherlands have separately upgraded their bilateral defence dialogues.
Brussels’ challenge is to convert that constellation of national efforts into a coherent EU policy without overpromising on hard security. Chatham House’s December analysis was emphatic that the Philippines’ chairmanship is unlikely to deliver the long-stalled ASEAN-China Code of Conduct in 2026, and Manila knows it. That diplomatic gap creates room, but also exposure, for the European Union, which can offer interoperability, training and legal expertise on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea without taking sides on sovereignty claims EU member states refuse to adjudicate. The Code of Conduct’s slow death is precisely what makes maritime domain awareness, where the European track record is strongest, the natural anchor for the next phase of the relationship.
The risk for Manila is that EU enthusiasm proves rhetorical. The risk for Brussels is that the chairmanship year ends without a portable European policy that survives the transition to whichever ASEAN member assumes the chair in 2027. Both sides therefore have a finite window to convert dialogue infrastructure into operational outputs. The shape of those outputs, joint patrols in illegal fishing zones, formalised IORIS access, EU observer status at maritime exercises, will determine whether the Indo-Pacific strategy Brussels published in 2021 has finally found its concrete Southeast Asian application.




