Parliament has honoured the International Criminal Court in open defiance of US sanctions. The legal tool that would protect the court, the EU blocking statute, still sits unused.

On 22 October, the European Parliament awarded its 2026 Sakharov Prize to the International Criminal Court and its officials. Roberta Metsola said the Union is built on respect for multilateralism and international institutions. Nobody in Strasbourg pretended the choice was neutral. On 9 October, hours after former ICC judge Navi Pillay was named Nobel Peace laureate, Washington sanctioned the court as an institution, going beyond its earlier listings of individual judges and prosecutors.

The tool that would actually protect the court is the EU blocking statute. Three days before the award, a Commission spokesperson said activation remains on the table, but that no decision had been taken and no date set.

What the Blocking Statute Would Do

The blocking statute, Regulation 2271/96, applies to foreign measures listed in its annex. For those measures, it bars EU operators from complying unless they are authorised to, makes foreign rulings that enforce them unenforceable in European courts, and allows those harmed to recover damages. Today the annex covers only US measures on Cuba and Iran.

The statute has limits worth stating plainly. It cannot remove American jurisdiction: a European bank with US operations would still face penalties in the United States. It does not oblige any supplier to keep serving the court, and the Commission can authorise compliance where refusal would seriously damage a firm’s interests. What it changes is the legal position inside Europe, where walking away because of the listed measures would no longer be a cost-free choice.

For the court, the difference is practical. Sanctions on an institution work through its suppliers: the banks that hold its accounts, its insurers, and its software and telecoms providers. A European supplier currently faces US penalties for continuing to serve the court and no EU legal duty to stay. The effect is already visible. The court has spent the past year preparing a fallback, including a move away from US software and from its insurer, Axa.

The Case for Waiting

The Commission’s caution has a basis. When the annex was last updated in 2018, after Washington reimposed sanctions on Iran, most large European firms left Iran anyway. Access to the American market outweighed a rule that was rarely enforced, and companies found themselves caught between two legal systems with little real protection from either.

There is also a diplomatic argument for patience. Washington has issued time-limited licences, and the EU’s statement of 10 October read the delayed entry into force as room for diplomacy towards reversal. Marco Rubio has said the measures were designed to give the court’s member states space to negotiate. Brussels, the spokesperson said, still hopes for a better outcome.

Why the Iran Precedent Points the Other Way

The Iran comparison is weaker than it looks. In 2018 the blocking statute was asked to protect an entire trading relationship involving thousands of firms whose largest market was the United States. Here it would protect one institution, headquartered in The Hague, served by a short list of European counterparties. A narrow shield is easier to enforce and easier to defend before national courts.

The case for waiting also cuts both ways. US firms have roughly six months to wind down their dealings with the court. That window gives diplomacy time, but it is also the period in which European suppliers decide whether to stay. Every bank or insurer that leaves before the annex is amended makes the eventual decision less useful.

The court itself has asked for more. Even before the institutional listing, its registrar, Osvaldo Zavala Giler, had urged the EU to be ready to use a blocking mechanism that would shield European countries from the sanctions’ reach beyond US borders.

The legal route is shorter than the politics suggests. Updating the annex is a Commission delegated act: a rule the Commission adopts itself, which takes effect unless the legislators object. Parliament can object by a majority of its members, and the Council by qualified majority, within a fixed scrutiny period. A government that opposes the move would need to assemble a blocking coalition; it has no veto. Parliament has already signalled its view: on 13 October, 58 MEPs from four political groups wrote to Ursula von der Leyen asking her to activate the blocking statute. The Netherlands, which hosts the court, has asked the Commission to prepare for the same step.

A Deadline the Union Has Already Set

The Sakharov ceremony will take place in Strasbourg during the December plenary. That is a fitting symbolic deadline for adopting the delegated act. The practical deadline matters more. An amended annex takes effect only after the scrutiny period, and European suppliers need it in force before the main US licence expires on 7 April. Parliament and the Council have two months to object, which either can extend by two more. In 2018 the Iran update took exactly two months to apply. On that timetable, an annex adopted in December takes effect in February at the earliest, and only around the April expiry if the scrutiny period is extended. December leaves little margin. The decision should be paired with the practical work the Netherlands is leading with other states parties on banking and services, so that the court has somewhere to move if a supplier still walks away.

Washington’s sanctions are a bet that European companies will comply quietly while European institutions issue statements. A prize, a letter from MEPs, and a declaration of regret all fit that bet. Only an amended annex changes it, because only the blocking statute puts a legal cost in Europe on abandoning the court. If the Commission waits for Washington to back down, it may be right about the diplomacy and still lose the court’s suppliers. Strasbourg has handed the court its prize. Brussels still holds the shield.