Budapest: Hungarian stocks, government bonds and the forint have rallied since the Tisza party’s landslide victory in the April parliamentary election, on expectations that the new government under Prime Minister-designate Péter Magyar will pursue pro-market reforms and a normalised relationship with the European Union institutions. The Commission has confirmed that technical meetings with the incoming Hungarian government have begun, signalling the procedural starting point of what observers describe as the most significant transition in the bloc’s eastern flank since the 2024 Polish election.
The political shift in Budapest has direct fiscal stakes. Under the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Hungary has until 31 August 2026 to complete 27 rule of law supermilestones, including reforms to judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks. Failure to comply puts the entire 10.4 billion euro envelope at risk. As of early 2026, approximately 19 billion euros in cohesion and recovery funding remained suspended, with 1 billion permanently lost. The Magyar government’s stated intention to rebuild the system of checks and balances aligns with the substantive milestones that the Commission has set as conditions for fund release.
The Commission’s 2023 decision to release 10.2 billion euros after Hungarian judicial reforms was challenged by the European Parliament before the Court of Justice. In February 2026, the Advocate General recommended annulling the Commission decision, with a final ruling pending. The case has significance beyond Hungary, given that the Court’s judgment will clarify the legal standards governing rule-of-law conditionality decisions and the discretion the Commission enjoys in determining whether milestones have been met.
The European Parliament’s second interim report on Hungary’s Article 7 proceedings, adopted on 25 November 2025 with 415 votes in favour, condemned what MEPs characterised as systematic undermining of EU founding values and renewed the call for Council action under Article 7(2). The procedure has been open since 2018, with no recommendations issued and no vote taken on the suspension of voting rights. The change of government in Budapest opens the question of when sufficient reform has been demonstrated to close the proceedings — a procedural question that the Council has not previously had to address in either the Hungarian or the Polish case.
Market signals reflect the changed political environment. Hungarian government bond yields have tightened significantly since the election result, with foreign investors returning to the Hungarian sovereign debt market after years of caution. The Budapest Stock Exchange’s main index has reached multi-year highs, and the forint has strengthened against the euro. Analysts at major European banks have raised Hungarian sovereign and corporate ratings outlooks, citing the prospect of unblocked EU funds, fiscal consolidation under the new government and the resumption of normal channels of cooperation with the European institutions.
The Liberties’ 2026 Rule of Law Report, prepared before the election, classified Hungary as a Dismantler, with the country reportedly continuing to pursue regressive laws and policies. The Magyar government inherits a media and judicial landscape that will require sustained reform to restore the institutional balance that the 2010 to 2026 period eroded. Tisza’s policy programme has been scarce on specifics, but the prime minister-designate has indicated priorities including economic stabilisation, weakening Fidesz’s control of public media, judicial reform and addressing systemic corruption in public procurement.
The procedural test in the coming months is dual. On one side, Hungary must demonstrate measurable progress on the RRF supermilestones before the August 2026 deadline. On the other, the Commission must establish clarity and transparency in its decisions to release funds, given the criticisms levelled at the 2023 release that the European Parliament has formally challenged. The intersection of legal proceedings, financial conditionality and political transition will define the operational reality of EU rule-of-law governance throughout the year.




