Darmstadt: The EU Space Act is still searching for a Council position more than a year after the European Commission proposed it on 25 June 2025. The draft regulation aims to create the first comprehensive framework for space activities across the Union, built on three pillars of safety, resilience and sustainability. Member states back those goals, but a series of compromise texts shows that they disagree about how far Brussels should reach.
The Danish Presidency circulated the first compromise text in December 2025, and the Cyprus Presidency followed with a revised version in March 2026. Neither document is a final Council position, and the European Parliament has not yet adopted its first-reading position either. The ordinary legislative procedure therefore remains open on both sides, which leaves operators across the sector without a clear picture of their future obligations.
National security is the sharpest dividing line. Several governments object to provisions that reach into defence, dual-use technology and security matters. The presidency texts try to separate commercial activities, which the EU Space Act would regulate, from defence-related ones that stay mainly national. Capitals that run military space programmes want that boundary written clearly before they accept any common rule.
Spaceports and launch infrastructure raise a second question. Both presidency texts favour more national discretion and a narrower EU regime than the Commission’s broad functional approach. Governments that host or plan launch sites want to keep control over licensing, safety zones and local planning, and they argue that these matters depend on geography as much as on law.
Emergencies and crisis response create a third strand. States prefer greater operational autonomy for national authorities, particularly for fast access to space-based information when a disaster strikes. The EU Space Act would otherwise place some of those decisions in a shared framework, and ministries are reluctant to hand over control during a crisis.
Cybersecurity adds technical complexity. Concerns about overlap with the NIS2 Directive have led both presidency texts to align the new obligations with existing cybersecurity rules and to cut duplicate compliance work. Satellite operators, who already face reporting duties under NIS2, have asked for exactly that kind of alignment, and the latest drafts move in their direction.
Governance may prove the hardest issue for the EU Space Act. The Commission envisaged a substantial role for the European Union Agency for the Space Programme, known as EUSPA, while several member states resist centralised oversight. They want national authorities to keep a larger share of supervision, with clear lines between national and EU bodies. Some governments also question whether full harmonisation is needed everywhere, especially where national systems already work well.
The outcome matters beyond the institutions. Operators, insurers and investors need predictable rules to plan constellations, launches and servicing missions, and non-EU companies that sell services in the single market will have to meet whatever standard emerges. A text that bends too far towards national discretion could fragment the market the Commission wants to unify.
The next stage for the EU Space Act depends on Parliament, which still has to settle its own position, and on a Council compromise that can attract a qualified majority. Observers expect governance, cybersecurity, national security and the limits of harmonisation to dominate the talks. The final EU Space Act may look quite different from the text that the Commission tabled in June 2025.
