Frankfurt: A decade after the collapse of a Latvian bank exposed how easily illicit cash could wash through the single market, Europe is finally building a central authority to police it. On 9 June, the EU’s new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, known as AMLA, gathered supervisors, financial intelligence units and bankers at the Alte Oper in Frankfurt for its first conference, a coming-out moment for an agency that began operating barely a year ago.
The gathering marked how far the project has travelled. AMLA formally started work on 1 July 2025, and on 1 January 2026 the European Banking Authority transferred to it all the anti-money laundering mandates it once held. The conference ranged across supervision, the role of financial intelligence in fighting transnational organised crime and the promise and peril of new technology in a field where criminals adapt quickly.
The rationale for centralisation is a long history of fragmentation. For years, money laundering oversight was left to national regulators of wildly varying ambition, and dirty money simply migrated to the weakest link. Scandals stretching from the Baltics to Scandinavia and beyond showed that a single market for capital had no single cop. AMLA is meant to close that gap, both by directly supervising a group of the highest-risk cross-border financial institutions and by setting common standards that national authorities must follow.
What matters now is whether the authority can match its mandate with muscle. AMLA has said it expects to be fully operational only in 2028, the point at which direct supervision of selected entities is due to begin in earnest. Until then it faces the unglamorous work of recruiting specialised staff, writing technical rulebooks and stitching together cooperation among national bodies that have long guarded their turf.
Supporters argue the new architecture is overdue and that a credible European supervisor will raise the cost of laundering across the bloc, deterring the institutional failures that repeatedly embarrassed regulators. Skeptics counter that an agency reliant on national authorities for much of its reach risks becoming a coordinator rather than an enforcer, and that its limited roster of directly supervised firms leaves vast swathes of the financial system in familiar national hands.
The coming months will test the balance. AMLA must publish the criteria for selecting the entities it will oversee, build the data systems to monitor suspicious flows and prove it can act faster than the networks it is chasing. For a union that has repeatedly vowed to stamp out financial crime and just as repeatedly watched it slip through the cracks, the Frankfurt authority represents both a genuine institutional leap and a promise that has yet to be kept.




