Lisbon: In a city that learned the hard way what happens when a mid-sized bank fails without a clear rulebook, the European Union has finally closed one of the longest-running gaps in its financial defences. The reform of the Crisis Management and Deposit Insurance framework, known in the jargon as CMDI, has been published in the Official Journal, completing a legislative journey that began years ago and giving the bloc a sturdier set of tools for handling banks that are too small for the headlines but too important to abandon.
The problem the reform addresses is specific. When the EU built its Single Resolution Mechanism a decade ago, it designed the machinery chiefly for large, cross-border institutions whose collapse could threaten the whole system. Smaller and medium-sized banks fell into an awkward middle ground: too modest to justify the full resolution apparatus, yet capable of inflicting real damage on a local economy if they were simply wound up under national insolvency law. The result, in case after case, was improvisation.
The revised framework widens the resolution toolkit so that authorities can manage those mid-tier failures in a more orderly way, with clearer access to industry-funded safety nets and a stronger emphasis on protecting depositors. The Single Resolution Board, which welcomed the publication, has described it as a refinement built on lessons from the mechanism’s first ten years rather than a wholesale redesign. On 12 June the Board convened a technical meeting to walk banks through fresh operational guidance, a sign that the focus is shifting from legislating to implementing.
Yet the reform also throws the unfinished business into sharper relief. The Banking Union still rests on two legs rather than three. A common European Deposit Insurance Scheme, meant to guarantee savers identically wherever they bank, remains stalled by the reluctance of member states to pool the risk. A shared public liquidity backstop for banks in resolution is likewise absent. Until both exist, a depositor’s ultimate protection still depends in part on the strength of their national government, precisely the link the Banking Union was created to sever.
For now, the CMDI reform represents real progress, hard-won and overdue. It will not, on its own, complete the Banking Union, and officials are careful not to oversell it. But it removes one of the more glaring weaknesses in the system and gives supervisors a credible answer to a question that has dogged them since the last crisis: what, exactly, do we do when a bank that is neither systemic nor negligible begins to fail?




