Kiruna: Sweden’s Esrange range sits far enough north that orbital mechanics favour it and far enough from Brussels that the regulatory argument feels abstract. It is not. Any operator launching from here, or selling satellite data into the Union, will eventually work under the proposed EU space act. The problem is that three versions of it currently exist and they disagree about important things.
The Commission tabled the proposal in June 2025 to replace a patchwork of national space laws with one authorisation regime covering safety, resilience and environmental footprint. Thirteen member states have national space legislation. Fourteen do not. Operators licensed in one country cannot assume recognition in another, and a company registering a constellation currently shops between regimes. A single rulebook fixes that. It also transfers authority from capitals to Brussels, which is why the file has moved slowly.
Parliament’s rapporteur, Elena Donazzan of the ECR group, published her draft report in March. The Cypriot Presidency circulated an updated Council compromise text at the end of the same month, following the Danish text from December. Negotiations continue in the Council’s Working Party on Space. Comparing the three documents produces a clear map of the disputes.
Cybersecurity requirements top the list. The Commission wants operators to meet common standards for uplink protection, encryption and incident reporting, on the reasonable argument that a compromised satellite is a hazard to everyone sharing the orbit. Smaller operators argue the requirements were written with large constellations in mind and scale badly downwards. Several member states want national security systems carved out entirely, which the Commission resists because a carve-out large enough to satisfy defence ministries would hollow out the regulation.
Third-country market access is the second fault line and the one Washington has raised most loudly. The proposal would require non-EU operators serving Union customers to demonstrate equivalent standards, and its anti-circumvention provisions target entities that dominate downstream data markets. American officials read that as a targeted measure. The Council’s own Legal Service added a separate difficulty in a January opinion, questioning whether parts of the regulation sit within the Union’s competence at all.
Debris rules attract less argument in principle and more in detail. Everyone agrees that end-of-life disposal, collision avoidance and tracking obligations belong in the text. Nobody has settled how retrospectively they apply to satellites already in orbit, or who pays when a deorbiting requirement outlives the company that launched the spacecraft.
Industry wants the file finished. Uncertainty is worse than a strict rule when investment cycles run a decade and insurance underwriters price regulatory risk. But a trilogue cannot start until the Council fixes a general approach, and the Working Party on Space has not delivered one. The Commission’s file page still shows the June 2025 proposal as the reference text, fourteen months on. That is the most honest summary available.





