The Council of the European Union circulated document 8861/26 on 8 May 2026, a presidency progress report that lays bare both the convergence and the unresolved fault lines inside the draft EU Space Act file. Delegations accepted that the compromise text has moved in the right direction by paring back complexity, but the report itemises a cluster of open issues that ministers will pick up when the Competitiveness Council reconvenes in research and space configuration on 28 and 29 May. The political weight of the discussion has grown considerably since the Commission tabled its original proposal, as member states begin to absorb how the regulation’s safety, resilience and sustainability obligations will interlock with national space programmes already in motion.
Scope sits at the head of the open questions. The draft text excludes space objects used exclusively for defence or national security purposes and those placed temporarily under military control, but the carve-out has been deliberately tight. Dual-use systems, which dominate the European order book through small-satellite constellations capable of switching between civil and military applications, remain inside the regulation. The European Parliament has signalled that this line is too narrow. Its rapporteur is pressing for the exemption to cover not only the objects themselves but the data and services they provide, and to replace the word “military” with the broader concept of “defence or national security”. Council delegations are split on whether to follow that lead, with capitals that host strategic launch infrastructure pulling in one direction and member states with civil-heavy programmes pulling in another.
Governance is the second pressure point. The progress note flags persistent disagreement over how responsibilities should be divided between the Commission, the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and national competent authorities. A recurring concern, voiced most forcefully by delegations with mature national licensing regimes, is the risk of a parallel Union regulatory layer that duplicates national procedures and creates administrative uncertainty. The text under negotiation pushes much of the operational supervision down to national authorities while routing third-country authorisations through a compliance board housed within the agency, an asymmetry that several capitals consider workable but underspecified.
Third-country treatment is the third unresolved file. The equivalence regime, intended to recognise non-EU regulatory frameworks that deliver comparable safety and sustainability outcomes, has been criticised as both too vague and potentially too generous. Operators headquartered outside the Union would otherwise face a dual-track authorisation process overseen directly by the agency, a heavier compliance footprint than EU operators registered through national competent authorities. How the equivalence test is calibrated will determine whether the Act becomes a magnet for foreign investment or a brake on it.
The legislative architecture is also being tested against the wider Union space portfolio. GOVSATCOM became operational on 27 January 2026, drawing in eight satellites from five member states, and the Commission has committed to delivering the first simplified version of IRIS² by 2029 with full system rollout aligned to the 2030 defence readiness goal. Norway and Iceland signed participation agreements in March, expanding the political coalition beyond Union borders. Member states want the Space Act calibrated so that it complements rather than complicates those programmes.
The progress report leaves the file in a familiar place. Direction is agreed, detail is contested, and ministers on 29 May will signal whether the Belgian and incoming Danish presidencies have enough political room to move the text into final trilogue territory before the autumn.
